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Opportunities for advances in climate change economics
Abstract
There have been dramatic advances in understanding the physical science of climate change, facilitated by
substantial and reliable research support. The social value of these advances depends on understanding their
implications for society, an arena where research support has been more modest and research progress slower.
Some advances have been made in understanding and formalizing climate-economy linkages, but knowledge
gaps remain [e.g., as discussed in (1, 2)]. We outline three areas where we believe research progress on climate
economics is both sorely needed, in light of policy relevance, and possible within the next few years given
appropriate funding: (i) refining the social cost of carbon (SCC), (ii) improving understanding of the
consequences of particular policies, and (iii) better understanding of the economic impacts and policy choices
in developing economies.
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CLIMATE ECONOMICS 
Opportunities for advances 
in climate change economics 
Target carbon’s costs, policy designs and developing coun-
tries. 
By M. Burke1, M. Craxton1, C.D. Kolstad1*, C. Onda1, H. Allcott2, E. Baker3, L. Barrage4, R. Carson5, K. 
Gillingham6, J. Graff-Zivin5, M. Greenstone7, S. Hallegatte,8 W.M.Hanemann9, G. Heal10, S. Hsiang11, B. Jones12, 
D.L. Kelly13, R. Kopp14, M. Kotchen6, R. Mendelsohn6, K. Meng15, G. Metcalf16, J. Moreno-Cruz17, R. Pindyck18, S. 
Rose19, I. Rudik20, J. Stock21 and R. Tol22 
There have been dramatic ad-
vances in understanding the 
physical science of climate 
change, facilitated by substan-
tial and reliable research sup-
port. The social value of these 
advances depends on understand-
ing their implications for so-
ciety, an arena where research 
support has been more modest and 
research progress slower. Some 
advances have been made in un-
derstanding and formalizing 
climate-economy linkages, but 
knowledge gaps remain (e.g., as 
discussed in (1, 2)). We outline 
three areas where we believe re-
search progress on climate eco-
nomics is both sorely needed, in 
light of policy relevance, and 
possible within the next few 
years given appropriate fund-
ing: refining the social cost of 
carbon (SCC), improving under-
standing of the consequences of 
particular policies, and better 
understanding economic impacts 
and policy choices in developing 
economies.  
 
REFINING THE SCC. The SCC is an esti-
mate of the monetized change in social 
welfare over all future time from one more 
tonne of carbon emitted today, conditional 
on a specific trajectory of future global 
emissions and economic and demographic 
growth (SCC is thus an estimate of costs 
avoided by not emitting an additional 
tonne). An understanding of the SCC is 
used in developing regulations directly or 
indirectly linked to climate change and is vi-
tal to building political support for domestic 
climate policies worldwide (3). The SCC is 
usually estimated using an integrated as-
sessment model (IAM), although other 
methods such as expert elicitation are be-
ing explored. Widely-used values for the 
SCC have been criticized, with particular 
skepticism surrounding the empirical basis 
used by IAMs to project climate damages 
and, thus, the SCC (4). We highlight five 
promising research directions to refine 
SCC estimates, which might then improve 
how they are used in policy (e.g. (5)).  
First, a better understanding of eco-
nomic impact of extreme climatic events is 
required. Economists can build on ad-
vances in our physical understanding of  
these low-probability, high-damage events 
(6) to study how changing likelihoods could 
affect damage estimates.  
Second, research is needed on how to 
represent potential damages that are 
poorly captured in typical economic output 
measures. Such “non-market” damages, 
which include potential costs of increased 
civil conflict, changes in human health, and 
biodiversity loss, could be sizeable (7), but 
are omitted from current damage estimates 
or are represented in an ad hoc way (e.g. 
as a simple multiple of market damages).  
Research should explore new methods for 
measuring key non-market outcomes (e.g. 
(8)), and should clarify how to incorporate 
accumulating evidence into IAMs. 
Third, work is required on how aggre-
gate economic output is affected by 
changes in the climate (9). How climate 
change or the rate of change affect the level 
of output, the growth rate of output, the 
stock of capital, or some other metric, can 
have a major impact on the SCC since it is 
a measure of accumulated damage over 
time. Current evidence is mixed, and re-
solving the debate will be crucial. 
The fourth area for research is adapta-
tion, which has potential to drastically 
change the gross damages from climate 
change. It is one of the least explored areas 
of climate economics, and little guidance is 
available on how to build adaptation into 
damage functions. For example, how farm-
ers may adapt agricultural practices may 
dampen agronomic estimates of damage 
from a change in climate. A frontier for re-
search is how to connect impact estimates 
derived from historical short-run fluctua-
tions in weather to potential future impacts 
from longer-run changes (incorporating ad-
aptation) in climate. Rigorous methods for 
doing this are in their infancy, and urgently 
need improvement (10).  
Finally, SCC-focused IAMs, the main 
tools for aggregating economic costs of mit-
igation and adaptation, and economic dam-
age from changed climate to produce SCC 
estimates, need a more structured way of 
incorporating new information. Damage 
functions in IAMs can rely on studies com-
pleted over 20 years ago (11). The treat-
ment of uncertainty in IAMs needs improve-
ment, with research needed on the 
computational challenges of explicitly in-
cluding decision making under uncertainty 
(12). Lastly, the choice in most existing 
IAM’s to examine the well-being (utility) of a 
representative agent may be inappropriate 
if impacts differ greatly by region or by type 
of agent. Understanding nuances of how 
these models aggregate costs and benefits 
across disparate regions and populations is 
of particular importance. 
 
IMPROVING POLICY DESIGN. Political 
resistance to carbon pricing in many juris-
dictions, and the emergence of a piecemeal 
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approach to domestic and international cli-
mate policy-making, mean that it is insuffi-
cient to just study how to price the climate 
externality in a “first-best” world with no 
other economic distortions. Though many 
existing “second-best” policies, such as ef-
ficiency standards and support for renewa-
bles, are cost-ineffective relative to carbon 
pricing (13), they continue to be imple-
mented for political, distributional, or other 
reasons.  
Research must consider practical di-
mensions of optimally designing and imple-
menting such policies. First, more rigorous 
ex post empirical analysis of energy and 
environmental policies will be critical (14). 
Policies such as carbon pricing schemes, 
tradable obligations, fuel taxes, renewable 
portfolio standards, and energy efficiency 
standards are already in use in different 
countries and will become more common 
as countries try to operationalize their 
pledges in the UNFCC process. But there 
is often little empirical evidence on individ-
ual- or market-level responses to these pol-
icies. Existing evidence suggests that be-
havioral responses to a given policy can 
drive a wedge between ex ante engineer-
ing estimates of program costs and bene-
fits, and ex post estimates of true costs and 
benefits (15). More evidence with rigorous 
analysis is sorely needed on a range of mit-
igation and adaptation policies. 
In the long term, the costs of addressing 
climate change using current technologies 
could be very large, making technological 
progress critical. A large body of work on 
the rate and direction of innovation exists, 
but research is needed on what combina-
tions of R&D and climate policies shape the 
innovation and diffusion of low carbon tech-
nologies (16).  
BEYOND ADVANCED ECONOMIES. 
Much of the existing research on climate 
damages or policies has focused on the 
developed world. This is problematic, both 
because developing countries currently 
represent the majority of the world’s popu-
lation and greenhouse gas emissions, and 
because the nature of impacts and context 
for policy choice could differ greatly relative 
to developed regions.  
  A first key research need is to rigorously 
quantify how vulnerability to climate 
change shifts as countries develop and the 
structure of their economies change, a 
question on which evidence is mixed (7). 
Attention to the burden borne by low-in-
come households will be important, as little 
is known about how changes in climate and 
climate policy affect these households’ 
productivity and livelihoods. Growing avail-
ability of expenditure surveys in these 
countries, potentially combined with re-
motely-sensed measures of livelihoods 
(17), could allow rapid progress. 
    Emerging economies will play an essen-
tial role in the success of mitigation efforts, 
given their projected demographic and eco-
nomic growth. Thus a second key research 
agenda will be to better understand climate 
mitigation options in the developing world. 
Carbon mitigation proposals have faced 
opposition in many developing countries 
because of concern that they could hamper 
growth by constraining energy supply and 
increasing costs (although a few middle in-
come countries are experimenting with car-
bon pricing). Yet, since tax evasion rates 
are lower for energy taxes compared to in-
come taxes (18), implementing a carbon 
tax may allow developing-country govern-
ments to simultaneously achieve climate 
policy goals and raise revenue. Research 
is needed on the feasibility of different pol-
icy tools in different political and institutional 
contexts, since the appropriateness of poli-
cies may differ in countries with heavily sub-
sidized fossil fuels, high rates of tax eva-
sion, and large informal and state-owned 
sectors. An understanding of how innova-
tion policy can be effective, and, more 
broadly, of how to make low-carbon tech-
nologies adoptable in the developing world, 
is also essential.  
      Our list of research priorities is not com-
prehensive and likely debatable. Others, in-
cluding some of the authors, might empha-
size other priorities (e.g., research on 
temporal discounting, international policy 
cooperation and coordination, or political 
economy). But what is crystal clear is that 
society is hampered in using natural sci-
ence knowledge of climate change due to 
gaps in the knowledge of economic and so-
cial dimensions of climate change. A much 
more substantive research program on the 
economics of climate change is essential, 
otherwise effective policy solutions with 
broad societal support will remain elusive. 
Future research must continue to include 
data-intensive empirical work to strengthen 
the foundations upon which policy-relevant 
“end products” are based (such as the 
SCC), along with research aimed at defin-
ing and reframing key questions. 
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